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family law.
Keywords

Taxation--Law and legislation; Domestic relations; Feminism; Law reform; Canada

This special issue article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol42/iss4/1

FEMINISM, LAW, AND PUBLIC
POLICY: FAMILY FEUDS AND
TAXING TIMES©
BY SUSAN B. BOYD AND CLAIRE F.L. YOUNG*

This article offers a retrospective analysis of
feminist research on tax and family law and
developments in these fields since the early 1980s. We
identify the sometimes contradictory trends-both in
legislation and in case law-that raise questions about
the influence that feminist research has had on these
areas of law. We then flag some ongoing challenges
confronting feminists engaged in law reform efforts.
Some common themes will emerge, but notable
differences are also evident in the ways that feminist
thought has played out in tax and family law.

Cet article offre une analyse retrospective de la
recherche feministe sur le droit fiscal et familial ainsi que
sur les d~veloppements dans ces domaines depuis le
drbut des annres 80. Nous identifions les tendances
parfois contradictoires, dans la legislation ainsi que dans
la jurisprudence, qui mettent en doute l'influence que la
recherche frministe a eu dans ces domaines de droit.
Nous soulignons par la suite quelques drfis courrant
confrontant les f6ministes employees i des efforts de
reforme de loi. Quelques th~mes communs 6mergent,
mais des differences marquantes sont 6galement
6videntes dans la mani~re dont la pense feminine ajou6
un r6le dans le droit fiscal et familial.
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FEMINIST RESEARCH ON FAMILY LAW AND TAX LAW

The mid-1980s was generally an exciting intellectual period for
those with an interest in law. Feminist legal studies was just taking off in
Canada, as was the law and society movement. The Canadian Journal of
Women and the Law was first published in 1985.
Although the fields of tax law and family law were barely touched
by feminism in the early 1980s, this situation quickly changed. Tax law had
been viewed in law schools as a highly technical field, largely devoid of
policy considerations. Family law was not viewed quite as rigidly, but it was
seen as a marginal field of law, something that female lawyers might be best
suited to practise.1 Family law was not even identified as a discrete field of
law in the Supreme Court Reports until the 1980s, 2 although taxation had
been included since the late 1880s. This all began to change by the mid1980s, a time when the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms3 was in its
infancy.
A.

Family Law: FeministInsights of the 1980s

The mid-1980s saw the development of an emerging literature
examining the operation of family law in its social context; exciting new
feminist voices were available. By the mid-1980s, Canadian family law had
responded to social forces such as the Women's Liberation Movement and
the increasing participation of women in the labour force, as well as the
introduction of the equality rights section of the Charter.4 A no-fault
approach was applied to divorce law, which now assigned reciprocal, and
ostensibly gender-neutral financial obligations between husbands and wives
rather than incorporating assumptions about female dependency and male
economic obligation. Feminists were aware that this gender-neutral
I See Canada, The Canadian Bar Association Task Force on Gender Equality in the Legal
Profession, Touchstonesfor Change: Equality,Diversity andAccountability (Ottawa: The Canadian Bar
Association, 1993) at 86-87 (Chair: Bertha Wilson).
2 Alison Harvison Young, "The Changing Family, Rights Discourse and the Supreme Court of
Canada" (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 749 at 754.
3 Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [Charter].An important conference in 1986-somewhat extraordinarily called The Socialization of
Judges to Equality Issues-assembled a number of feminists and other equality seekers in Banff, and
culminated in the publication of EqualityandJudicialNeutrality in 1987, which had a number of feminist
contributions, including some on family law, though not on taxation. See Sheilah L. Martin & Kathleen
E. Mahoney, eds., Equalityand JudicialNeutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987).
4 See e.g. Salina M. Shrofel, "Equality Rights and Law Reform in Saskatchewan:
An Assessment
of the Charter Compliance Process" (1985) 1 C.J.W.L. 108.
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approach might pose difficulties for women. Shelagh Day presciently
cautioned:
Amendments to definitions of "dependants" and provisions for husbands to make financial
claims on their wives can give the false impression that men and women are on an equal
economic footing. This juridical equality
may obscure the fact of women's continuing
5
economic dependency and vulnerability.

Judges such as Rosalie Abella and practitioners such as Louise
Lamb and Jean McBean were asking feminist questions about family law
during the 1980s.6 As well, the (now defunct) Canadian Advisory Council
on the Status of Women published an important book and several papers
on the impact of family law on women. Feminist family law professors were
especially influenced by feminist academics in other countries, such as
Martha Fineman 8 in the United States, and Carol Smart 9 in England, who
were opening up family law to critical inquiry. These authors questioned
how trends towards gender neutrality and formal equality were
compromising women's position in family law. As discourse drawing on
liberal notions of the autonomous individual 0 concerning the "clean break"
of partners upon divorce, self-sufficiency, and freedom of contract emerged
in Canada during the 1980s," these questions became crucially important.
Women were often precluded from economic remedies upon separation
and divorce, especially in the context of spousal support law after the Pelech
5 Shelagh Day,"The Charterand Family Law" in Elizabeth Sloss, ed., FamilyLaw
in Canada:New
Directions(Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1985) 27 at 52.
6 Rosalie Silberman Abella, "The Critical Century: The Rights of Women and Children from
1881-1982" (1984) 18 Gazette 40; Rosalie Silberman Abella, "Economic Adjustment on Marriage
Breakdown: Support" (1981) 4 Fain. L. Rev. 1; Rosalie Silberman Abella, "Family Law Perspectives"
(1982) 16 Gazette 204; Louise Lamb, Bill C-47: Joint Custody, Child Support,MaintenanceEnforcement
and Related Issues (Ottawa: National Association of Women and the Law, 1985) [Lamb, "Bill C-47"];
Louise Lamb, "Involuntary Joint Custody" (1987) 5 Herizons 31; and Jean McBean, "The Myth of
Maternal Preference in Child Custody Cases" in Martin & Mahoney, supra note 3, 184.
Sloss, supra note 5; Roxana Ng, S. Monteath & M. Stokes, Is 50-50 Equitable Division?
Some
Implicationsfor Women of Ontario'sFamily Law Reform Act (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on
the Status of Women, 1979).
8 See e.g. Martha Fineman, "Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction, and Social Change:
A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce" (1983) Wis. L. Rev.
789.
9 See e.g.
Carol Smart, The Ties That Bind: Law, Marriageand the Reproduction
of Patriarchal
Relations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984).
10 Suzanne Silk Klein, "Individualism, Liberalism and the New Family Law" (1985) 43 U.T. Fac.
L. Rev. 116.
1 Often traced back to Messier v. Delage, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 401, Lamer J.
dissenting.
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trilogy of 1987.12 Yet, as Mary Jane Mossman and Morag MacLean have
pointed out, in social welfare law it was assumed that women would depend
on family members for financial support. 13 These and other assumptions
were ultimately to the detriment of financially needy women who neither
qualified for social assistance nor had access to financial support of family
members. The Pelech trilogy generated considerable feminist commentary
that may in fact have been the most influential of all the feminist work we
will mention, as we see below in Part II.
Feminists were also opening new lines of inquiry about how familial
ideology-for instance, expectations of mothers-influenced judicial
decisions.14 It came to be recognized that women's lives were disciplined,
or regulated, by this discourse in judicial decisions. Women who best fit the
expectations of the good wife and mother tended to be the most successful
in legal disputes, while those who departed from those expectations were
often penalized. Women's autonomy to make lifestyle choices was thus
restricted if they wished to be successful in legal disputes. Feminists also
examined how these ideological expectations played out for women in child
custody law at a time that witnessed the rise of the fathers' rights
movement, joint custody, and mediation. 5 Although obtaining custody of
children has never been a straightforward matter for mothers when fathers
choose to contest the issue,16 the new liberal individualist discourses
rendered custody disputes even more precarious for women. The Canadian
Journal of Women and the Law published a special issue on child custody
law in 1989 that highlighted many of these issues including the particular
challenges faced by First Nations and lesbian mothers.1 7

12 Pelech v. Pelech, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 801 [Pelech]; Richardson v. Richardson,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 857

[Richardson];and Caron v. Caron, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 892 [Caron].
13,"Family Law and Social Welfare: Toward a New Equality" (1986) 5 Can. J. Fam.
L. 79.
14 See e.g. McBean, supra note
6.
15 See e.g. Martha J. Bailey, "Unpacking the 'Rational Alternative': A Critical Review of
Family
Mediation Movement Claims" (1989) 8 Can. J. Fain. L. 61; Susan B. Boyd, "Child Custody, Ideologies,
and Employment" (1989) 3 CJ.W.L. 111; Lamb, "Bill C-47," supra note 6; and Martha Shaffer,
"Divorce Mediation: A Feminist Perspective" (1988) 46 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 162.
16 Susan B. Boyd, Child Custody, Law, and Women's Work (Don Mills: Oxford University Press,
2003) [Boyd, Child Custody]. See also Karina Winton, "'The Spoilt Darling of the Law': Women and
Canadian Child Custody Law in the Postwar Period (1945-1960)" (2002) 19 Can. J. Fam. L. 193.
17
Patricia A. Monture, "A Vicious Circle: Child Welfare and the First Nations" (1989) 3 C.J.W.L.
1; Katherine Arnup, "'Mothers Just Like Others': Lesbians, Divorce, and Child Custody in Canada"
(1989) 3 C.J.W.L.18.
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Tax Law: Feminist Scholarship of the 1980s

B.

The 1980s also marked the emergence of feminist work in the tax18

area. Indeed, 1985 was a key year with two publications by Louise Dulude
and one by Kathleen Lahey. 19 These two authors drew, in part, on feminist

scholarship in family law in their consideration of whether the appropriate
tax unit was the individual, the family, or the married couple. They argued
strongly that Canada should not introduce the family, or indeed couples, as
the tax unit, an option that had been proposed in the past.2 ° One could say
their critique was successful; since that time there has been no serious

consideration of proposals for a change to the unit of taxation in Canada,

despite arguments by social conservatives for use of the marital unit. 21 The
authors also discussed the impact of the "hybrid" system that Canada had
(and still has), which retains the individual as the unit but also takes spousal
status into account for certain purposes. Thus, they looked at rules such as
the spousal exemption (now the Spousal Tax Credit) and considered the
negative impact that the rules could have on the autonomy of women.

Lahey, in particular, critiqued that provision on the basis that the tax
benefit of the exemption went primarily to men. Thus, she argued, the
exemption should be recast. 2

In 1987, Maureen Maloney produced a background paper for the
Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women titled "Women and
Income Tax Reform., 23 That report was more far-reaching than previous
18

"Tax and Family Laws: A Search for Consistency" in Sloss, supra note 5, 63; "Taxation of
Spouses: A Comparison of Canadian, American, British, French and Swedish Law" (1985) 23 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 67.
19 "The Tax Unit in Income Tax Theory" in E. Diane Pask, Kathleen E. Mahoney & Catherine
A. Brown, eds., Women, the Law, and the Economy (Toronto: Butterworths, 1985) 277 [Lahey, "Tax
Unit"].
20 Both the Royal Commission on Taxation (the Carter Commission) and the Royal Commission
on the Status of Women (the Bird Commission) had recommended that the family be the unit of
taxation in Canada. See Canada, Reportof the Royal Commission on Taxation:Taxation of Income, Vol.
3 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966) at 12-13, 122-23; Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on the
Status of Women (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970) at 291-307.
21 The Law Commission of Canada, drawing on much feminist work in the tax area, recommended
that "the individual, rather than the couple or some other definition of the family unit, should remain
the basis for the calculation of Canada's personal income tax." See Beyond Conjugality:Recognizing and
Supporting Close PersonalAdult Relationships (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government
Services, 2001) at 71.
22 Lahey, "Tax Unit," supra note 19 at 291-92.
23

1987).

Women and Income Tax Reform (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women,
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work and applied a feminist critique to the personal, corporate, and sales
tax systems in Canada. The following year, Kathleen Lahey wrote the
definitive work of that era on women and tax law-a 550-page report
funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
entitled "The Taxation of Women in Canada." Not only did that document
(unfortunately never published, albeit widely circulated) lay the foundation
for much future feminist writing in the area, but it is frequently referred to
today because it so clearly set out the challenges for the future.
Interestingly, and unlike in family law, virtually no feminist work on
tax emanated from the United Kingdom and very little emanated from the
United States during this time. 4 Canada was therefore a leader with respect
to feminist explorations in the tax area. However, much of this work was
based on a vision of the income tax system as one with two primary
purposes: to raise revenue and to redistribute income. Thus, the focus was
on issues such as the appropriate tax unit (all three authors); the overtaxation of women (Lahey); and the favouring of high-income earners over
low-income earners, which has a negative impact on women who tend to
earn less than men (Maloney). That early work did not focus to any great
extent on the expenditure side of the tax system, an issue to which we shall
return.
C.

Into the 1990s

The 1980s marked a flourishing of feminist literature inquiring into
the complex ways that family and tax laws affected women's lives and
women's decisions. Since that time, many feminist scholars have continued
and extended the parameters of that work, including Lisa Philipps25 in the
tax area, and Mary Jane Mossman, 26 Diane Pask, 27 Carol Rogerson, 2s and

24 An exception in the United States was the work of Grace Blumberg. See e.g. Grace
Blumberg,
"Features of Federal Income Tax Law Which Have a Disparate Impact on Women and Working
Couples" (Paper presented to the Joint Economic Committee for Economic Problems of Women, 93rd
Cong., 1973) at 228-53,273-78; Grace Blumberg, "Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income
Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers" (1971) 21 Buff. L. Rev. 49.
25 See e.g. Lisa Philipps, "Tax Law: Equality Rights: Thibaudeauv. Canada" (1995) 74 Can. Bar
Rev. 668.
26 See e.g. Mary Jane Mossman, "Running Hard to Stand Still: The Paradox of Family Law
Reform" (1994) 17 Dal. L.J. 5 [Mossman, "Running Hard"].
27 E. Diane Pask, "Gender Bias and Child Support: Sharing the Poverty" (1993) 10 Can. Fam.
L.Q. 33.
28 See e.g. Carol Rogerson, "Spousal Support after Moge" (1997) 14 Can. Fam. L.Q. 281.
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Jane Pulkingham 29 in the family law area (to name a few). Some feminist
scholars such as Margrit Eichler 30 and Ellen Zweibel3 looked at both family
law and tax in their work, reflecting in part the growing interest in how tax
law related to child support.
In family law, though less so in tax law, feminist practitioners such
as Miriam Grassby and Cynthia Devine published work identifying
problems in their fields,32 as did Supreme Court of Canada Justice Claire
L'Heureux-Dub. 3 3 Moreover, both the National Association of Women
and the Law (NAWL) and the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund
(LEAF) increasingly achieved a presence in both the family law and tax
fields by publishing in the area.34 LEAF intervened in cases such as Moge v.
Moge3t and Thibaudeau v. Canada,36 and NAWL presented briefs to the
government.37 NAWL adopted a more proactive approach in the tax field as
it began to appear before the House of Commons Finance Committee in
the early 1990s to make representations about budget issues as they

29 Jane Pulkingham, "Private Troubles, Private Solutions: Poverty among Divorced Women and
the Politics of Support Enforcement and Child Custody Determination" (1994) 9 C.J.L.S. 73.
30 Margrit Eichler, Family Shifts: Families, Policies, and Gender Equality (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1997).
See e.g. Ellen Zweibel, "Child Support Policy and Child Support Guidelines:
Broadening the
Agenda" (1993) 6 C.J.W.L. 371.
32
Seee.g. Miriam Grassby, "Spousal Support-Assumptions and Myths Versus
Case Law" (1995)
12 Can. Fam. L.Q. 187; Miriam Grassby, "Women in Their Forties: The Extent of Their Rights to
Alimentary Support" (1991) 30 R.F.L. (3d) 369; Cynthia Devine et al., Fairnessin FamilyLaw: A Study
by the ManitobaAssociation of Women and the Law Inc., ed. by Mona G. Brown & Sheryl Rosenberg
(Winnipeg: Manitoba Association of Women and the Law, 1994).
33 See e.g. Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, "Making Equality Work in Family Law" (1997) 14
Can. J .Fam.
L. 103.
34 Karen Busby, Lisa Fainstein & Holly Penner, eds., Equality Issues in
Family Law:

Considerations
for Test Case Litigation (Winnipeg: Legal Research Institute of the University of Manitoba, 1990)
[EqualityIssues].
[1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 [Moge]. Moge addressed the question of whether a long-standing order for
spousal support to be paid by a husband to a wife emanating from a divorce from some years previous
should be terminated.
36 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 [Thibaudeau].For a collection of LEAF's factums, including these two cases,
see Women's Legal Education and Action Fund, Equality and the Charter: Ten Years of Feminist
Advocacy before the Supreme Courtof Canada (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1996).
See e.g. National Association of Women and the Law, Child Support Guidelines (Ottawa:
National Association of Women and the Law, 1995); National Association of Women and the Law,
Response to Custody andAccess: PublicDiscussionPaper(Ottawa: National Association of Women and
the Law, 1994).
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affected women.3 8 Relatively few initiatives were taken, though, to invoke
the Charterin relation to either family law or tax law. During this period
there was, of course, an animated debate about the merits and
disadvantages of Charter litigation as a strategy for advancing women's
equality interests. Some argued that due to the public/private divide,
barriers arose in relation to using the equality rights section as a tool for
advancing women's rights.3 9 Particular difficulties arose in relation to
attempts to use the Charter to challenge issues in family law given then
construction of many family law issues as residing in the private sphere. 4
As we shall see, the two attempts to invoke the Charterin relation to tax law
were not greeted with resounding success. Coincidentally, both cases
related to highly gendered issues within the family: child care and child
support.
Meanwhile, however, some feminist scholarship was challenging the
very boundaries of what we think of as family law, moving beyond
traditional topics related to separation and divorce and turning attention
towards how law regulates familial relations in a variety of fields such as
social welfare and child welfare law.41 In turn, these topics often raised
questions of difference among women along lines of class, race, and sexual
orientation, and inquiry broadened to take more specific account of the
ways in which Aboriginal women and lesbians were affected by family law.42

38 See e.g. National Association of Women and the Law, Background Paper in Support of Tax
Resolutions (Ottawa: National Association of Women and the Law, 1991).
39
Judy Fudge, "The Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities of and the Limits
to the Use of
Charter Litigation to Further Feminist Struggles" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 485.
40 Susan B. Boyd, "The Impact of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms on Canadian Family Law"
(2000) 17 Can. J. Fam. L. 293. But see LEAF's efforts in this direction in Equality Issues, supra note 34.
41 Shelley A.M. Gavigan, "Familial Ideology and the Limits of Difference" in
Janine Brodie, ed.,
Women and CanadianPublic Policy (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1996) 255; Shelley A.M. Gavigan,
"Paradise Lost, Paradox Revisited: The Implications of Familial Ideology for Feminist, Lesbian and Gay
Engagement to Law" (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall L.J. 589; Dorothy E. Chunn, "Feminism, Law, and Public
Policy: 'Politicizing the Personal"' in Nancy Mandell & Ann Duffy, eds., Canadian Families:Diversity,
Conflict and Change (Toronto: Thomson-Nelson, 1995) 177; Dorothy E. Chunn, From Punishment to
DoingGood:FamilyCourtsandSocializedJusticein Ontario,1880-1940 (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1992).
42 See e.g. Katherine Arnup, "Finding Fathers: Artificial Insemination, Lesbians, and the Law"
(1994) 7 C.J.W.L. 97; Shelley A.M. Gavigan, "A Parent(ly) Knot: Can Heather Have Two Mommies?"
in Didi Herman & Carl Stychin, eds., Legal Inversions: Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Politics of Law
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995) 102; Marlee Kline, "Complicating the Ideology of
Motherhood: Child Welfare Law and First Nation Women" (1993) 18 Queen's L.J. 306; Monture, supra
note 17.
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Traditional boundaries were also challenged in the tax area. Issues
such as the taxation of wealth (as opposed to income),43 the role of familial
ideology as well as technical discourse in tax law, 44 and the relationship
between the tax system and retirement savings 45 were the subject of feminist
scrutiny. As with family law, some feminist work examined the differences
among women, 6 although issues of race have not received as much
attention in Canada as in the United States.47
Overall, by the mid-1990s, feminists had identified the following key
issues confronting women in tax and family law:
1. Women's economic insecurity, which was often related to
their familial and caregiving roles and, in particular, their
unpaid labour in the home;
2. The perils of formal equality and gender neutrality for
women, both of which were connected to liberal individualist
ideology that favoured the unencumbered male; and
3. The impact of familial ideology, particularly for women who
strayed from normative roles expected of wives and mothers,
such as lesbians, First Nations women, low-income single
mothers, and full-time employed mothers.

43

Lisa Philipps, "Tax Policy and the Gendered Distribution of Wealth" in Isabella
Bakker, ed.,
Rethinking Restructuring: Genderand Change in Canada(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996)
141.
Lisa Philipps, "'The Family' in Income Tax Policy" (1995) 16 Pol'y Options 30;
Lisa Philipps,
"Discursive Deficits: A Feminist Perspective on the Power of Technical Knowledge in Fiscal Law and
Policy" (1996) 11 C.J.L.S. 141 [Philipps, "Discursive Deficits"].
See Barbara Austin, "Policies, Preferences, and Perversions in the Tax-Assisted
Retirement
Savings System" (1996) 41 McGill L.J. 586; Claire F.L. Young, Women, Tax, and Social Programs:The
Gendered Impact of Funding Social Programs Through the Tax System (Ottawa: Status of Women
Canada, 2000) at 41-53 [Young, Women, Tax. and Social Programs].
46 Claire F.L. Young, "(In)visible Inequalities: Women, Tax and Poverty" (1995) 27 Ottawa L.
Rev. 99.
47 There has been more focus in the U.S. tax policy literature on issues of race. See
e.g. Karen B.
Brown & Mary Louise Fellows, eds., TaxingAmerica (New York: New York University Press, 1996);
Dorothy A. Brown, "Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint Return" (1997)
54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1469; and Stacey Y. Adams, "Income, Deductions and Wealth: A Survey of
Policy Remedies to the Intersection of Color, Gender and Taxation" (2001) 28 S.U.L. Rev. 255.
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IMPACT OF FEMINIST WORK ON LAW AND PUBLIC
POLICY

Although the burgeoning feminist research on family law and
taxation was of high quality, the really important question is what influence
it had on law and public policy. At this juncture, something must be said
about the multifaceted roles played by both family law and tax law.
While tax has in the past been viewed as private law, that is, as a
relationship between the taxpayer and the tax collector, that vision is
archaic and flawed. It also ignores several realities, including the fact that
our tax system has a redistributive function: by imposing marginal tax rates
that increase as income increases, a redistribution of income is
accomplished. More importantly, however, the view of tax law as private
ignores the expenditure function of the tax system. Put simply, the
government uses the tax system to subsidize numerous endeavours.
Measures such as tax deductions, tax credits, and tax deferrals all result in
less tax payable by the taxpayer. The amount of the reduction in tax is, in
fact, a subsidy, or the functional equivalent of a grant. That is to say, the
government could have delivered the subsidy by way of a direct grant to the
individual, but instead has chosen to deliver it through the tax system. For
example, the refundable child tax credit (a tax expenditure) replaced the
family allowance grant given to mothers in recognition of the costs of
raising children.48 This spending function of the tax system makes it a
supremely important public policy instrument.4 9
Similarly, in the family law arena, the characterization of family law
as purely private law-or the notion that family law exclusively regulates
private relations between individuals in families-is out of date. It is now
widely acknowledged that family law reflects fundamental Canadian social
issues, such as changing definitions of family. In part, it is the fact that
family law in conjunction with constitutional law provides a forum for those
social issues to be determined-for example, same-sex relationship
recognition and the determination of who qualifies as family-that has
rendered family law a more public field. 0 As well, feminists have pointed
out that the public, or the state, has an interest in family law's ability to

48 For an analysis of the child tax credit see Young, Women, Tax, and Social Programs,supra note
45 at 32-36.
49 The Department of Finance has published tax expenditure accounts each year since
1997. See
e.g. "Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2003," online: Department of Finance
<http://www.fin.gc.ca/toce/2003/taxexp03_e.html>.
50 Young, supra note 2.
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enforce private economic obligations between family members. 5 As we will
see, this insight has been crucial in understanding the downside to some
apparent feminist success stories in spousal support law, as well as the legal
recognition of same-sex partners as spouses.
To return to our original question, then, what influence has feminist
work had on law and public policy? Unquestionably, there has been a
feminist influence, albeit not notably until the early 1990s and then, we
would suggest, for a rather short period and in a somewhat limited manner.
The limited impact of feminism in part reflects the continuing difficulty that
feminists have encountered in bringing differences among women to the
forefront of law reform initiatives, and in particular, to the forefront of
litigation.52 The feminist influence that has been seen was promoted by the
increasing attention that appellate judges-especially on the Supreme
Court of Canada-were paying to the values promoted by the Charter,
notably in relation to equality rights.53 This influence was particularly
noticeable in family law, and less so in tax law. However, even in family law,
the influence of Charterrights discourse also had a downside. At the very
least, it could be a double-edged sword, for example, by offering fathers'
rights advocates a tool to challenge laws perceived to favour women. At
worst, it exacerbated differences among women by enhancing the legal
position of women who were more privileged, for instance, by their class or
race, relative to less advantaged women.
Four themes are discernible in relation to law and public policy.
These themes are not to be viewed in isolation, but rather are related to,
and often in tension with, one another. Indeed, a key challenge for
feminists in the future is how to engage with these sometimes contradictory,
perennial themes. While the themes show the enduring nature of the
problems identified by feminists-for example, economic insecurity and
familial ideology-these problems are not static, but rather assume
different forms over time. As a result, feminist strategies may need to
change accordingly. The four themes are:
1.

Liberal Individualism (women as autonomous, self-sufficient
agents);

51 See e.g. Susan B. Boyd, "(Re)Placing the State: Family, Law, and Oppression" (1994) 9 C.J.L.S.
39 [Boyd, "(Re)Placing the State"].
52 This inability has not been for lack of academic discussion about the consequences of actual
differences. For example, in October 1993, the Institute of Feminist Legal Studies of Osgoode Hall Law
School held a workshop titled, "What Difference Does Difference Make?"
53 Young, supra note 2.
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2.

Privatization of Economic Responsibilities;

3.

Gender Neutrality and Formal Equality; and

4.

Familial Ideology: The Post-Divorce Family Unit.

A.

LiberalIndividualism

1.

Arguing for Substantive Equality in Support and Property Law

By the 1990s, numerous feminist scholars and practitioners had
pointed to the problematic impact on divorcing women of the emphasis on
self-sufficiency and freedom of contract in the 1987 Supreme Court of
Canada Pelech trilogy,5 4 which permitted spousal support to be limited by
domestic contracts except in limited circumstances. Authors such as Carol8
5
57
Rogerson, 55 Brenda Cossman, 56 Diana Majury, and Martha Bailey
emphasized that the gender-based inequality of women within heterosexual
families had not yet disappeared, despite the increased number of women
in the labour force. They argued that judges needed to consider this
inequality as well as unequal bargaining power as they interpreted
legislation, particularly in the spousal support context. These feminists
suggested that in this area, as in others, judges needed to adopt a
substantive equality approach rather than a formalistic approach. It was
premature to treat women and men identically in family law, or in
bargaining over domestic contracts, because women and men were not yet
equal within families, or indeed, within society. As well, women continued
to contribute considerable unpaid labour within the family, and that labour
needed to be recognized.
The 1992 Court decision in Moge dramatically shifted this area of
family law and is renowned for having moved spousal support law towards
a recognition of women's systemic inequality, caused in part by the law's
failure to recognize their unpaid labour.5 9 LEAF intervened in that case to

54 Supra note
12.
55"The Causal Connection Test in Spousal Support Law" (1989) 8 Can. J. Fam. L. 95.
56 "A Matter of Difference: Domestic Contracts and Gender Equality" (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 303.
57
"Unconscionability in an Equality Context" (1991) 7 Can. Fam.
L.Q. 123.
58 "Pelech, Caron, and Richardson" (1989) 3 C.J.W.L. 615.
59

Moge, supra note 35.
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argue that the spousal support provisions in the Divorce Act 60 must be
guided by the Charter guarantees of gender equality, interpreted as
substantive equality.6' Although the Court did not explicitly acknowledge
that spousal support provisions must be interpreted and applied in a
manner consistent with constitutional equality standards, Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 implicitly did so when she articulated a model of
equitable sharing of the economic consequences-both disadvantages and
advantages-of the marriage and/or its dissolution for the majority of the
Court. It became acceptable again to acknowledge the social fact that
women-both in modem and in traditional relationships 6 2-tend to assume
more responsibility than men for domestic labour and child care, and that
women's inequality in the labour force is connected to that reality. The
Court's decision in Peter v. Beblow, which expanded the application of
constructive trust or unjust enrichment law in relation to property claims
by unmarried partners, also reflected this acknowledgement of the value of
women's unpaid labour in the home.63 In family law in the early 1990s, then,
the liberal individual was re-situated in her gendered, familial context, at
least in relation to economic remedies vis-A-vis her spouse. As we shall see,
however, this same contextual approach did not prevail in relation to child
custody law.
2.

Retaining the Liberal Individual in Tax Law

In contrast, the liberal individualist model of responsibility, which
obscures both the social relations of gender and the sexual division of
labour, was alive and well in the tax law of the 1990s. The Symes case
illustrates this point. 64 Beth Symes argued that her child care expenses
should be deductible under the Income Tax Act 65 as a business expense,
60 R.S.C. 1985, c. 3.
61 See especially Moge v. Moge in Women's Legal Education and Action Fund, Equality and the
Charter: Ten Years of Feminist Advocacy before the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery, 1996) 323 at 329. For a discussion of this case, see Alison Diduck & Helena Orton,
"Equality and Support for Spouses" (1994) 57 Mod. L. Rev. 68.
62 But see Beverley McLachlin, "Spousal Support: Is It Fair to Apply New-Style Rules to
Old-Style
Marriages?" (1990) 9 Can. J. Fam. L. 131.
63 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980. In this case, McLachlin J. wrote for the majority of judges, while Cory J.
wrote a concurring judgment (for L'Heureux-Dub6 and Gonthier JJ.). Both judgments citedMoge,supra
note 35.
64
Symes v. Canada(TD), [1989] 3 F.C. 59; MNR v. Symes, [1991] 3 F.C. 507 (C.A.) [Symes FCA];
and Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695 [Symes SCC].
65 R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c. I-5
[iTA].
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given that she incurred the expenses to "gain or produce income" within the
meaning of the ITA. She also argued that to deny her the deduction of this
business expense discriminated against her on the basis of sex, in
contravention of section 15(1) of the Charter,because women bear the
disproportionate burden of childcare expenditures. The Court did not
accept this argument, and held that the expenses were not deductible
because another provision of the ITA (section 63) allowed deduction of a
limited portion of the expenses. The Symes case was controversial for many
reasons, one of which was for the fact of who stood to benefit from the new
tax subsidy had Symes been successful. Indeed, in contrast to cases such as
Moge, LEAF refused to intervene and support Symes, in part out of a
concern that a victory for Symes would only have benefited business women
(and men), and not employed or indeed unemployed women.66 Here,
however, we will focus on the approach of the Federal Court of Appeal and
the Supreme Court of Canada in denying Symes' claim, and what it reveals
about their resistance to placing the liberal individual in her social context.
As Rebecca Johnson argues in her outstanding book,67 the Symes
case was all about issues of gender, class, and, to a certain extent, the
unequal division of childcare labour in families. Yet two of these issues
were erased by the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. For
example, rather than analyzing Symes' position as that of a business woman
relative to a business man in terms of the refusal of Revenue Canada to
permit the deduction, the Federal Court of Appeal compared Symes to
other women who did not earn business income. Justice Decary accused her
of "trivializing" the Charterand said that he was "not prepared to concede
that professional women make up a disadvantaged group., 68 Gender was
rendered invisible. What is especially interesting about Justice Decary's
decision is the theme that emerged and that continues in later cases: the use
of class to trump gender. Justice Decary viewed Beth Symes as privileged
by class, and that allowed him to ignore the gendered nature of Symes'
claim. Certainly Beth Symes, a practising lawyer, was more privileged than
many women by reason of her education and occupation, but at the same
time, that privilege should not have been permitted to erase her gender
disadvantage.

66 It should be noted, however, that the Symes case was brought forward
after years of
unsuccessful lobbying for increased direct child care funding. The litigation was partly in response to
the lack of political action. See Rebecca Johnson, Taxing Choices: The Intersectionof Class, Gender,
Parenthoodand the Law (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2002).
67 Ibid.
68

Symes FCA, supra note 64 at 531.
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At the Supreme Court, the majority concluded both that section 63
of the ITA was a complete code for the treatment of child care expenses, so
that there was no issue of deducting these as a business expense, and that
Symes had failed to demonstrate that women carry a disproportionate
burden of child care expenses. In reaching the latter conclusion, the
majority did acknowledge that child care responsibilities have a negative
impact on women's participation in the paid labour force, but then quickly
brushed that point aside. As Justice Iacobucci stated,
[Symes] has failed to demonstrate an adverse effect created or contributed to by s. 63,
although she has overwhelmingly demonstrated how the issue of child care negatively affects
women in employment terms. Unfortunately proof that women pay the social costs is not
sufficient proof that women pay child care expenses.69

Thus the disproportionate impact of child care responsibilities on
working women was erased by the Court. In contrast, and in the minority,
the two women on the Court took a very different approach. For them the
gendered nature of caregiving was obvious and relevant. As Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 said, Symes "has proven that she has incurred an actual
and calculable price for child care and that cost is disproportionately borne
by women. ' ° The difference between the majority judgement of Justice
lacobucci and the minority judgement of Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 was
stark, and indeed, the judgments have been described as two solitudes.7 ' As
we discuss below, these solitudes-in terms of understanding the
complexities of the feminist critique of tax law-continued in Thibaudeau,
72
the next section 15(1) tax case contemplated by the Supreme Court.
Thus, in contrast to the success in terms of the recognition of
women's systemic inequality with respect to spousal support in Moge, tax
law remained impervious to a substantive equality analysis of issues such as
the gendered nature of caregiving and women's inequality in the labour
force. This reluctance likely stemmed in part from the Court's perception
that tax law is simply a set of codified rules for raising revenue, the
interpretation of which is best left to tax lawyers who understand their
complexities. Even though the Supreme Court did discuss some of the
socio-economic issues involving business women and their child care
responsibilities, it was unable to make the link between those issues and tax
law. The unencumbered liberal individual remained at the heart of tax law.
69
70

Symes SCC, supra note 64 at 765.
Ibid. at 821.

71 Debra McAllister, "The Supreme Court in Symes: Two Solitudes" (1994) 4 N.J.C.L.
248 at 263.
72 Thibaudeau, supra note 36.
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Privatizationof Economic Responsibilities

The recognition of women's inequality within the heterosexual
family that was achieved in the Moge case was of crucial importance and
had a ripple effect in relation to other economic disputes in family law.
However, the Court's decision in Moge did not escape the critical eye of
feminist legal scholars. For instance, Colleen Sheppard noted the Court's
failure to situate its discussion of the economic responsibilities of individual
spouses within the larger context of gender, race, and language-based
discrimination.7 3 Mrs. Moge was an immigrant woman with a limited
knowledge of English and little educational training. As a result of the
narrow consideration of the causes of the economic difficulties faced by
Mrs. Moge, Sheppard argued, the case supported the adoption of a
privatized response to economic inequality.
Feminists in the 1990s began to examine the paradox that, despite
considerable reform activity in spousal support and property law, women
and children were "running hard to stand still" 74 ; they were experiencing
seriously high levels of poverty after marriage breakdown. Family law
reform activity gave the appearance that women and children's poverty had
been dealt with at a public policy level. Yet family law remedies were
seriously limited due to their location in the private sphere of the family: a
woman or child's economic remedy was only as good as the wealth of her
75
former spouse, and her ability to pursue an effective legal remedy.
Enforcement of private judgements for matrimonial property or financial
support also remained a serious problem, as the tragic story of Rosa Becker
revealed.76 Despite the clear limits of privatized remedies, public remedies
available through the social welfare system were being steadily cut back as
economic restructuring, financial retrenchment, and privatization became
favoured public policy tools of government.7 7 In other words, the issue of
"Uncomfortable Victories and Unanswered Questions: Lessons from
Moge" (1995) 12 Can. J.
Fam. L. 283.
Mossman, "Running Hard," supra note
26.
76

Boyd, "(Re)Placing the State," supra note
51.
Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834. A few years after winning this landmark Supreme Court

of Canada case awarding her a share of the property of her common law partner, Rosa Becker
committed suicide on November 5, 1986. During the intervening years, Lothar Pettkus made it
extremely difficult for Rosa Becker to receive what she was owed. when some of his property was
liquidated, the money went to Rosa's lawyer. By the time she died, Rosa had received none of the
compensation owed to her. See Nora Underwood, "Rosa Becker's Hollow Victory" Maclean's (24
November 1986) 50.
See Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds., Privatization,Law, and the Challenge
of Feminism
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002).
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women's and children's poverty was being privatized again (not that it ever
had been fully addressed in relation to public policy).
In particular, as child poverty was increasingly highlighted as a
social concern, child support emerged during the 1990s as a public policy
issue and not simply a private obligation as between separated parents.78
Numerous government studies on child support appeared, culminating in
the introduction in 1997 of several legislated changes: child support
guidelines, stricter enforcement, and changes to the income tax law rules on
inclusion and deduction of child support payments. These changes were
widely viewed as a response to feminist concerns, particularly by fathers'
rights advocates and some members of the Canadian Senate. Paradoxically,
however, public discourse around child poverty has increasingly been
severed from that around women's poverty. 79 Nevertheless, these changes
to child support law generated a backlash against feminism-and against
mothers-that in turn generated problems in relation to child custody law.
The now infamous Special Joint Parliamentary Committee on Custody and
Access was instituted to review custody and access law, responding to a
notion that fathers should have more rights vis-A-vis children if they were
going to have enhanced (privatized) financial obligations towards their
children (and, as they viewed it, towards their mothers). 80
Also relevant to privatization were the several challenges brought
during the 1990s to the legal failure to recognize same-sex relationships.
These challenges-supported generally by feminist groups such as LEAFculminated in M. v. H.,81 where the Supreme Court of Canada declared
Ontario's definition of spouse for the purposes of spousal support claims
under the Family Law Act 82 to be unconstitutional because it excluded
same-sex, but included opposite-sex, cohabitants. This decision prompted
numerous law reforms, both federal and provincial, which extended the
legal recognition of same-sex partners for many purposes. While this
development marks a stunning reversal of discriminatory trends against
lesbians and gay men in Canadian law, its rationale provided by the
Supreme Court is, in part, problematic. The majority judgment
78 Mary Jane Mossman, "Child Support or Support for Children? Re-thinking 'Public' and
'Private' in Family Law" (1997) 46 U.N.B.L.J. 63.
79Wanda Wiegers, The Framingof Poverty as "Child Poverty" and its Implications
for Women
(Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 2002).
80
Bonnie Diamond, "The Special Joint Committee on Custody and Access: A Threat to Women's
Equality Rights" (1999) 19 Can. Woman Stud. 182.
81 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3.
82 R.S.O. 1990 c. F.3.
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acknowledged that the purpose of spousal support law is to provide for the
equitable resolution of economic disputes that arise when intimate
relationships break down between individuals who have been financially
interdependent, rather than to reinforce rigid gender roles. In that regard,
Justices Cory and Iacobucci recognized that same-sex relationships were
capable of being both conjugal and lengthy. So far, so good. However, the
Supreme Court also emphasized another important objective of support
law: to alleviate the burden on the public purse by shifting the obligation to
provide support for needy persons to parents and spouses. 83 The connection
could not be clearer between recognizing spouses-even same-sex spouses
-and neo-liberal objectives, including privatization. As Hester Lessard has
stated:
The de-gendered, potentially non-heterosexist, individual responsibility model of family has
a number of attractions from a neo-liberal perspective. This model is simultaneously more
inclusive of a range of possible spouses and family formations, conceptually structured to
obscure a systemically entrenched sexual division of labour, and in its "responsibility"
language, more explicit in its commitment to the role of family in privatizing social needs.'

In M v. H, we thus saw the explicit connection between expanding
economic obligations between domestic partners and the privatization of
economic responsibilities within the family, an imperfect system of
providing economic security at best, as well as one that prompts the
diminishing of publicly funded systems. 5
It was not only cases such as M. v. H. that contributed to this
privatization. The ModernizationofBenefits and ObligationsAct,86 which was
enacted soon after the Supreme Court decision in M. v. H., amended sixtyeight pieces of federal legislation to recognize same-sex relationships. One
of those was the ITA, 87 which was amended to include same-sex cohabitants
as common law partners, along with opposite-sex cohabitants. As a result,
all income tax rules that looked to spousal status now applied equally to
same-sex couples. The Minister of Finance was no doubt in favour of such
a change because it resulted in an estimated tax windfall to the government
83 Supra note 81 at 72.
84 Hester Lessard, "Mothers, Fathers, and Naming: Reflections on the Law Equality Framework
and Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General)" 16(1) C.J.W.L. [forthcoming in 2005] [Lessard,
"Mothers, Fathers, and Naming"].
85 Susan Boyd, "Family, Law, and Sexuality: Feminist Engagements" (1999) 8 Soc. & Leg. Stud.
369; Brenda Cossman, "Family Feuds: Neo-Liberal and Neo-Conservative Visions of the
Reprivatization Project" in Cossman & Fudge, supra note 77, 169 [Cossman, "Family Feuds"].
86 S.C. 2000, c. 12.
87

Supra note 65.
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of over 30 billion dollars. The main reason for this windfall is that many
economically needy individuals now found themselves ineligible for the
Canada Child Tax Benefit or the GST tax credit, because eligibility for those
benefits is determined on the basis of combined spousal income. The result
is an overall reduction in the value of the credit because the taxpayers are
no longer treated as individuals, which means they pay more tax or, to put
it another way, they receive less of the tax subsidy. The family must now
pick up the economic shortfall. The paradox of the recognition of same-sex
partners is that the privatization of economic well-being is increased, with
a disproportionate impact on low-income persons and women, whose
domestic labour is typically taken for granted and left largely
uncompensated.
C.

Neutralizing GenderAgain: The Rebirth of FormalEquality

The impact of the recognition of women's inequality within
marriage in the Moge case in relation to spousal support in the early 1990s
was limited in another way. The Supreme Court decision in Moge did not
signal the beginning of a systematic gender-based analysis across family law
and tax law. To the contrary, in several areas, gender neutrality now
prevails to the point where offering a feminist analysis is frowned upon. As
this problem is so fundamental, we offer several examples at some length.
Child custody law provides a prime example, despite (or perhaps
because of) it often being characterized as a key site for "the gender wars."
In this field, partly due to the rise of rights discourse and the influence of
the fathers' rights movement, and partly because of long-standing feminist
pressure on men to assume more responsibility for childcare, judges and
public policy makers have become increasingly reluctant to emphasize
gendered social patterns.88 Even though studies show that mothers continue
to assume primary responsibility for children and related domestic labour,8 9
in legal fora a great resistance has grown to acknowledging this genderbased pattern. Numerous legal trends have diminished the custodial
parent's-usually the mother's-decision-making powers and enhanced the
powers of fathers. In other words, mothers carry significant caregiving
88 Boyd, Child Custody, supra note 16.
89

Canadian statistics regarding the sexual division of unpaid housework in general indicate a slight

increase in male participation in household work. Generally, however, men still engage in more paid
work, while women continue to be primarily responsible for childcare and domestic labour. See Erin
Anderssen, "Census: Women Do Lion's Share at Home" The Globe and Mail (12 February 2003) A7;
Amber Gazo-Windle & Julie Ann McMullin, "Doing Domestic Labour: Strategizing in a Gendered
Domain" (2003) 28 Can. J. Soc. 341.
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responsibilities but have lost the ability to make autonomous decisions in
relation to those responsibilities. Conversely, non-custodial parents, mainly
fathers, have gained rights without necessarily assuming responsibilities.
Statistically, the evidence for this trend is that joint legal custody orders
upon divorce increased in number dramatically from the 1980s to the end
of the 1990s. Joint custody awards are consistently rising and now approach
40 per cent of divorce orders involving children, although it is clear that
children continue to live primarily with their mothers. 9°
Parents are thus being treated as gender-neutral entities in custody
law, and feminist efforts to point to the ongoing gendered nature of
parenting responsibilities have not been embraced with enthusiasm by most
judges or law reformers. Two key custody cases that went to the Supreme
Court of Canada in the 1990s, Young v. Young9 and Gordon v. Goertz,92
revealed an increasing marginalization of the analysis offered by Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6, who emphasized the gender of parenting as part of the
social context surrounding child custody disputes.93 In law reform initiatives,
feminist voices raising concerns about legislative trends towards shared
parenting and maximum contact between children and non-custodial
parents were also marginalized (although arguably these voices tempered
the extent to which Bill C-22, An Act to Reform the Divorce Act, moved
towards a shared-parenting norm).9 4 As Hester Lessard so eloquently puts
it in her analysis of Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General),9' "formal
equality presumes the fundamental interchangeability of male and female
parents as members of the liberal community. ,96 Feminist analysis, which
90 Statistics Canada reports that of the 37,000 dependents for whom custody was determined
through divorce proceedings in 2000, custody of 37.2 per cent of dependents was awarded to the
husband and wife jointly: "Divorces" The Daily (2 December 2002), online: Statistics Canada
<http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/021202/d021202f.htm>. Even when joint custody is awarded,
children are likely to reside primarily with their mothers. See Nicole Marcil-Gratton & C61ine Le
Bourdais, Custody,Access and ChildSupport: FindingsFrom the NationalLongitudinalSurvey ofChildren
and Youth (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1999) at 20-21.
91 [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3.
92 [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27.
93

See Susan B. Boyd, "Contextualizing the Best Interests of the Child: Justice L'Heureux-Dubb's
Approach to Child Custody and Access Law" in Elizabeth Sheehy, ed.,Adding Feminism to Law: The
Contributionsof Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dub6 (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2004) 165.
94 Susan B. Boyd, "Walking the Line: Canada's Response to Child Custody Law Reform
Discourses" (2004) 21 Can. Fam. L.Q. 397; Helen Rhoades & Susan B. Boyd, "Reforming Custody
Laws: A Comparative Study" (2004) 18 Int'l J.L. Pol'y & Fam. 119 [Rhoades & Boyd, "Reforming
Custody Laws"].
9S [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835 [Trociuk].
96 Lessard, "Mothers, Fathers, and Naming," supra note 84.
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places male and female parents in their gendered social context (as well as
their racialized and sexuality contexts), runs counter to this dominant
formal equality discourse.
Less obviously perhaps, the same-sex marriage impetus also reflects
a gender-neutral trend in family law. The recognition of same-sex
relationships rests largely on the notion that same-sex partners can be just
as loving and committed as opposite-sex partners-in other words, that
gender is not relevant. For instance, the success of M. v. H. rested partly on
the fact that spousal support laws were gender neutral: obligations between
husbands and wives were reciprocal, not resting on their gender; so why
should same-sex partners be omitted from spousal support obligations?
While offering a logical rationale for the extension of spousal support
obligations, this gender-neutral rhetoric also tends to occlude the extent to
which marriage is, for many women, the legal institution within which they
experience economic and psychological disadvantage that results in a
diminishing of their autonomy. Somewhat perversely, then, the struggle for
legal recognition of same-sex marriage has diminished our ability to offer
a feminist analysis of women's continuing systemic inequality within
heterosexual relationships, or the other ways in which marriage contributes
to systemic inequalities.9"
Two recent Supreme Court of Canada cases on domestic contracts,
98 and Miglin v. Miglin,99 exemplify the resistance
Hartshornev. Hartshorne
to acknowledging women's systemic inequality within marriage. In these
cases, the discourse that dominated the Pelech trilogy 0 0 -of choice and
individual responsibility, and freedom from state-imposed norms-emerge
once more, despite the fact that Miglin ostensibly overrules the Pelech
trilogy. Hartshorneis the Court's most recent pronouncement on freedom
of contract in family law. Here, a well-educated woman trained in law, who
had been previously married, and who had legal advice about the unfairness
of the marriage agreement she was being asked to enter, signed the
contract, albeit under protest. She "chose" to bargain away her rights,
apparently with her eyes wide open, and the Supreme Court took this
"choice" seriously in determining that the contract was "fair."
97 For our effort to do so, see Susan Boyd & Claire Young, "'From Same-Sex to No Sex'?: Trends
Towards Recognition of (Same-Sex) Relationships in Canada" (2003) 1 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 757.
98 [2004] 1 S.C.R. 550 [Hartshorne].For two commentaries on Hartshorne,see Martha Bailey,
"Marriage h la Carte: A Comment on Hartshorne v. Hartshorne" (2004) 20 C.J.F.L. 249 [Bailey,
"Marriage Ala Carte"]; Martha Shaffer, "Domestic Contracts, Part II: The Supreme Court's Decision
in Hartshornev. Hartshorne" (2004) 20 C.J.F.L. 261. Shaffer's analysis is closer to that offered here.
[2003] 1 S.C.R. 303 [Miglin]
10 0
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The constraints on Mrs. Hartshorne's choice-which, in our view
and in the view of the dissent written by Justice Deschamps, were highly
gendered-were not taken seriously. First, she met her husband, who was
older than her, at the law firm where he was a partner and where she
articled and became an associate. Second, he presumably had greater
bargaining power than she did: he had assets worth 1.6 million dollars when
they married whereas she had debts. Third, Mr. Hartshorne required
signing of the agreement on the wedding day, having made it clear that the
marriage would not otherwise occur. Fourth, the couple already had a oneyear-old child at the time of the marriage. Mrs. Hartshorne had given up
her legal career at the time of the birth of their first child, and then
continued as primary caregiver for this and their second child. After
separation, Mrs. Hartshorne had custody of both children, one of whom
had special needs. The Supreme Court characterized this decision that Mrs.
Hartshorne mind the home front as hers alone,' 01 not a decision taken by
the couple. Yet the trial judge noted that Mr. Hartshorne had supported
Mrs. Hartshorne's decision to remain out of the labour force to care for
their children.
Fairness was also characterized in a narrow manner in Hartshorne.
The Court analyzed the issue of fairness in terms of two individuals who
made promises about the disposition of assets in the event of divorce. This
"fair" settlement left Mrs. Hartshorne at divorce, after twelve years of
cohabitation and nine years of marriage, during which she did not work
outside the home and was economically dependent on Mr. Hartshorne, with
only 27 per cent of the value of the matrimonial home (280 thousand
dollars). Mr. Hartshorne left with 1.2 million dollars. Notably, Justice
Bastarache said he was not unmindful of the systemic problems discussed
in Moge, but stated, "ultimately, it is fairness between the parties that is at
issue here."' 1 2 In other words, Justice Bastarache severed an analysis of
systemic, gender-based inequality-and of the larger social context
emphasized in Moge-from an analysis of what is fair between two
presumptively equal individuals. The Globe and Mail endorsed the
approach: "There's a word for that reasoning: fair." Since the engaged
couple could have realistically contemplated the ultimate implications of
their marriage agreement, and there was no duress or coercion,"people who
signed agreements should be expected to live up to the obligations they
undertook."'0 3 The use of the word "people" in the editorial is indicative
101 Hartshorne,supra note 98 at 584.
102 Ibid. at 576.
103 "After the Prenuptial Pact," Editorial, The Globe and Mail (27 March 2004) A22.
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also of the approach of the court: women and men are deemed to be
formally equal in the eyes of the law. If women emerge from marriages in
poor economic positions and with childcare responsibilities, it is not the job
of family law to redress this problem, provided that such a problem could
have been contemplated at the signing of a contract. The Court was content
to return Mrs. Hartshorne to what they assumed would have been her
(poor) market position anyway: poorer than Mr. Hartshorne." 4 The fact
that Mrs. Hartshorne's gender might have some influence on both her
market position and the result of her marriage breakdown went largely
unnoticed.
Some feminist commentators suggest that the Miglin decision, and
presumably the Hartshornedecision as well, rest on narrow facts, and that
the Moge analysis of Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 regarding marriage as an
economic partnership has not necessarily been eroded. 5 Hopefully, this
assessment is true. However, we would suggest that these two recent
decisions on domestic contracts convey a message that women lawyers, and
perhaps other professional women, should beware: their legal training
places them at risk of never receiving a sympathetic ear from a judge. So
they had better make sure that their domestic partner signs an agreement
that will not leave them with responsibility for children and with limited
resources. They will be held to the bargain, no matter how unfair its
outcome. Possibly, judges will be more sympathetic towards nonprofessional women, but this case was decided under British Columbia
family law legislation that is far more flexible than most other provinces in
terms of allowing judges to consider the fairness of outcomes. Most, if not
all, other provinces have a higher unconscionability threshold for judicial
intervention in contracts. So women outside British Columbia are likely to
be in an even worse position should they try to challenge domestic contracts
in which they bargained away matrimonial property rights.
The liberal individual unfettered by gender or familial ideology has
arguably returned to family law, at least in the contractual context. In fact,
family law seems to offer different messages regarding economic remedies,
depending on whether women are perceived as having made a choice or
not, either by marrying or by contracting. 10 6 In Nova Scotia (Attorney

104 Hartshorne,supra note 98 at 584. Mr. Hartshorne had argued, and the Court appeared to
agree, "that there is no indication that twelve years of practising law would have yielded the respondent
more assets than those with which she is leaving this marriage."
105 E. Llana Nakonechny, "Spousal Support Decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada: New
Model or Moving Target?" (2003) 15 C.J.W.L. 102.
106 See Bailey, "Marriage Ala Carte," supra note 98.
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General) v. Walsh, 1°7 in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of
excluding common law couples from statutes on division of matrimonial
property, the Court sent a clear message that choosing marriage indicates
a decision to be covered by statutory rules on property division. Not
choosing marriage, or failing to contract into a matrimonial property
regime, indicates a desire to be a liberal individual. After Hartshorne,even
if married, those who choose to relinquish their rights in a domestic
contract will have a tough time re-opening that agreement. Conversely,
women who do not sign away rights in a domestic contract may well be able
to obtain matrimonial property rights or spousal support under the
reasoning of Moge, and more recent cases such as the 1999 decision in
Bracklow v. Bracklow.'0 ° In that case, the wife, who had worked for some
time during the marriage and contributed financially as well as with unpaid
labour to the household, eventually became physically and mentally
disabled. The Court signaled that there was a "basic social obligation"
between spouses (at least, married spouses), which meant that the husband
in that case owed a duty of spousal support even though it was through no
fault of his own that the wife's economic prospects had suffered such
decline. 109 Unlike Moge, however, Bracklow rested less on a gender-based
analysis of economic disadvantage within marriage, and more on an
understanding of basic social obligations of (ostensibly genderless) marital
partners, which is consonant with the privatizing trend in family law. °
Echoes of the choice discourse that characterizes a formal equality
approach also emerge in the way the tax system is used to deliver social
programs. As mentioned earlier, the tax system has an expenditure function
and is increasingly being used to deliver social programs. For example, the
tax system is the primary method by which the government funds child
care."' Another example of a social program funded by the tax system is
107 [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325.
108 [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420 [Bracklow].
109 Note, however, that upon rehearing the trial judge determined that Mr. Bracklow's obligation
was time limited in scope. Bracklow v. Bracklow (1999), 181 D.L.R. (4th) 522 (B.C.S.C.).
110 Indeed, McLachlin J. refers explicitly to placing the primary burden of support on partners,
not the state: supra note 107 at 23, 31.
III There is some debate about whether the child care expense deduction is a tax expenditure.
The
Department of Finance lists all the tax expenditures, but categorizes the child care expense deduction
as a "memorandum" item, that is, an item that is not technically a tax expenditure. See Department of
Finance, Tax Expenditures and Evaluations, 2003 (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2003) online:
Department of Finance <http://www.fin.gc.ca/toce/2003/taxexp03_e.html> [Finance, Tax]. Claire
Young disagrees with this categorization because the tax deduction is a subsidy that is intended to assist
families in paying for child care. On this point, see also Sheila Block & Allan Maslove, "Ontario Tax
Expenditures" in Allan Maslove, ed., Taxes as Instruments of Public Policy (Toronto: University of
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retirement savings. The government encourages citizens to save for
retirement and to contribute to "private" pensions such as occupational
pension plans (called RPPs) and Registered Retirement Savings Plans
(RRSPs) by giving significant tax breaks.'1 2 Retirement saving is subsidized
extensively through the tax system through the use of tax preferences in
respect of contributions to RPPs and RRSPS. These tax preferences take the

form of a tax deduction for contributions to the plans and the even more
valuable sheltering of income earned by the plans until the funds are
withdrawn, generally in retirement. For 2004, the value of both types of
preferential tax treatment for RPPs is projected to be over 14 billion dollars
while the amount of the subsidy for RRSPS is projected to be over 16 billion
dollars." 3 Put another way, the government is spending more than 30 billion
dollars a year to persuade citizens to contribute to these private pension
plans and together these subsidies constitute the largest personal tax
expenditure each year.
One major problem with this policy is that it operates on an
assumption of unfettered choice and gender neutrality. No account is taken
of the socio-economic realities that shape women's lives in comparison to
those of men. Furthermore, it assumes that everyone has equal access to
these tax subsidies. If an individual "chooses" not to take advantage of
them, then she must bear the consequences. Yet when we look at how one
gains access to these expenditures, we see that the gender
neutrality
114
embedded in tax rules clearly discriminates against women.
First, far fewer women than men have access to occupational
pension plans, largely due to women's mode of participation, or lack
thereof, in the paid labour force. Even though more women than ever work
outside the home, the employment rate for women is considerably less than

Toronto Press, 1994) at 178.
112 This policy is also part of the privatization of responsibility for economic security alluded to
earlier. We hear dire threats that the Canada Pension Plan is underfunded and that the Old Age
Security (OAS) cannot be relied on in the future. Already we see the demise of the universality of the
OAS, with the tax clawback. The government, aided by the private sector banks and trust companies, put
a lot of energy into touting RRSPS as the way to go. The message is, "Look to the private sphere, not the
state, for your economic security in old age." That sphere includes the private market in the form of
your employer in the case of occupational pension plans, banks and trust companies in the case of
RRSPs, and also includes the private family-your spouse for example-with respect to pension survivor
benefits or spousal RRSPS.
113 See Finance, Tax, supra note
111.
114 Several other tax subsidies for personal savings also reflect the privatization policy of placing
responsibility on individuals to provide for themselves and their families rather than on public programs.
Examples are the tax deductions in the ITA for contributions to the Home Buyer's Plan (section 146.01),
the Lifelong Learning Plan (section 146.02) and the Registered Education Savings Plan (section 146.1).
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that of men. In 2001, 56 per cent of women over age fifteen had jobs, while
the figure for men was 67 per cent. u5 For aboriginal women and women
with disabilities the participation rate is disturbingly low. Indeed Disabled
Women's Network Ontario (DAWN) has estimated that 65 per cent of
women with disabilities who wish to work are unemployed.11 6 For these
women, there is no choice. But it is not only women's lack of participation
in the paid labour force that limits their ability to benefit from these tax
subsidies. The kind of work that women do is also a major factor. Only
those who work for relatively large employers, economically able to provide
a pension plan, will benefit. Those who work part-time (and women have
formed at least 70 per cent of part time workers since the 1970s)"' and
those who are self-employed or unemployed cannot benefit. Moreover, the
"choice" to work part-time, or to be self-employed and work at home, is
often not a real choice. Childcare responsibilities frequently require that
women take part-time jobs or jobs with more flexible work hours.
In relation to the approximately 17 billion dollars spent on
subsidizing contributions to RRSPs, the government would say that gender
is taken into account because the RRSP is primarily intended to assist
women who may not have access to occupational pension plans. That
sounds fair until one examines the statistics. First, more men than women
contribute to RRSPs. In 2000 (the latest figures available), 3.5 million men
contributed while the figure was only 2.8 million for women.' 18 That figure
is particularly shocking because men have greater access to occupational
pension plans, and many men may have therefore exhausted their available
contribution room on that plan so they cannot contribute to an RRSP even
if they have the money to do so. For many women, in contrast, an RRSP is
their only private pension plan. Second, women contribute significantly less
money than men to RRSPs and therefore they receive less of the tax subsidy.
In 2000, men contributed a total of 17.5 billion dollars while women
contributed only 10.6 billion dollars. 19
The government policy on retirement savings is based on an
assumption of choice: women can contribute to RRSPS if they wish. Yet that
115 Housing, Family and Social Statistics Division, Women in Canada: Work Chapter Updates
(Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2004).
116 Canadian Labour Congress, Women's Work. A Report (Toronto: Canadian Labour Congress,
1997) at 5.
11
7Supra note 115 at
8.
118,,Income Statistics 2002-2000 Tax Year, Final Basic Table, All Returns by Age and Sex" online:
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/agency/stats/gbOO/pst/final/tablese.html>.
119 Ibid.
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assumption is fallacious because women's incomes are lower than men's
and so women will have less discretionary income to contribute. Increasing
the amount that can be contributed to an RRSP, as the government has done
lately, is of no benefit to those women who cannot afford to use all the
RRSP room available to them. Moreover, the tax subsidy is, in part,
delivered by way of a tax deduction, the value of which depends on the rate
at which tax is paid. A contribution of 10 thousand dollars by a high-rate
taxpayer paying at an average rate of 40 per cent yields a tax savings of 4
thousand dollars, whereas for a person with a low income (more often a
woman) who pays tax at an average rate of 10 per cent, the tax savings is
only 1 thousand dollars.
The current policy with respect to the subsidization of retirement
saving can thus be seen as a failure for women, many of whom continue to
live in poverty in their retirement. They do not get their fair share of the tax
subsidies in part because no account is taken of the socio-economic realities
of women's lives and the impact these realities have on their ability to make
choices given by the tax system. Unequal gender relations are neutralized
and women are falsely assumed to be formally equal in the context of
economic decisions, just as in the Hartshornecase.1 20
D.

FamilialIdeology: The Post-DivorceFamily Unit, or "Reconstructing"
the PatriarchalNuclear Family

In the previous section, we suggested that as the twentieth century
waned, women's unequal position within the family and in relation to
employment was rendered increasingly invisible in tax and family law.
Ironically, at the same time, the conditions that reproduce women's
inequality within the family (including familial ideology) were being
reconstructed in the name of children. Dawn Bourque has called this trend
"reconstructing the patriarchal nuclear family."' 121 As we shall see, the
Supreme Court of Canada calls it the "post-divorce family unit." Family law
has, it seems, moved from a central preoccupation with adult relationships
to a concern with preserving parent-child relationships. This preoccupation
endorses at a superficial level the notion of formal equality between
mothers and fathers and is connected to the privatization of economic

12 0

Hartshone,supra note 98.

121 Dawn M. Bourque, "'Reconstructing' the Patriarchal Nuclear Family: Recent Developments

in Child Custody and Access in Canada" (1995) 10 C.J.L.S. 1.
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responsibilities for children. 122 It also has a highly gendered impact on
women, who retain de facto, even if not de jure, primary responsibility for
children.
Considerable efforts have been made in child custody law, as well
as in law reform initiatives, to enhance the contact between non-custodial
parents (mostly fathers) and children. In some countries, mothers who fail
to facilitate contact in the manner expected are vilified and labeled as
"implacably hostile" or "no-contact mothers," and these trends are evident
in Canada as well. 2 a
Meanwhile, child support obligations have been enhanced between
fathers and children. These trends play out differently for biological and
non-biological fathers, but are relevant to both. There is less emphasis on
a biological father's adult relationship with a mother when determining his
parental status, rights, and responsibilities; his status as a "natural" parent
suffices. However, mothers are still highly relevant in terms of cementing
the father-child relationship: mothers are being legally constituted in a way
that obliges them to ensure that their children build relationships with
biological fathers, sometimes regardless of whether the parents ever
cohabited together or with the children, and often compromises their own
autonomy. 124 In the case of non-biological fathers, child support law has
increasingly imposed financial obligations on men who are regarded as
"standing in the place of a parent," 125 usually by reference to the man's
relationship with the mother of the child. Once married to, or cohabiting
with, a child's mother, it will be harder for a step-parent to avoid child
support obligations. Together these trends can be summarized as a move
in the legal system to create "post-divorce family units," or, as Bourque
would put it, to re-privatize the family in its traditional, patriarchal, nuclear
12 6
form.
Familial ideology has experienced a rebirth in the name of children.
122 Susan Boyd, "Legal Regulation of Families in Changing Societies" in Austin Sarat, ed., The
Blackwell Companion to Law and Society (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2004); Lessard, "Mothers,
Fathers, and Naming," supra note 84.
123 See Helen Rhoades, "The 'No-Contact Mother': Reconstruction of Motherhood in the Era
of the 'New Father"' (2002) 16 Int'l J.L. Pol'y & Fam. 71; Felicity Kaganas & Shelley Day Sclater,
"Contact Disputes: Narrative Constructions of'Good' Parents" (2004) 12 Fem. Legal Stud. 1; and Boyd,
Child Custody, supra note 16, c. 6.
124 Trociuk, supra note 95; Lessard, "Mothers, Fathers, and Naming," supra note 84. If trends in
Australia are any indication, even lesbian co-mothers will not necessarily be permitted to define their
own nuclear family unit in isolation from the biological father/sperm donor of a child. Fiona Kelly,
"Redefining Parenthood: Gay and Lesbian Families in the Family Court-the Case of Re Patrick"
(2002) 16 Austl. J. Fam. L. 17.
125 Chartierv. Chatier,[1999] 1 S.C.R. 242. See Cossman, "Family Feuds," supra note 85.
126 Bourque, supra note 121.
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These trends can also be discerned in tax law. In 1995, two years
after the Symes decision, the Supreme Court released its decision in
Thibaudeau.21 7 Suzanne Thibaudeau argued that the requirement that she
include child support payments from her ex-husband in income for the
purpose of income tax discriminated against her on the basis of her family
status in contravention of section 15(1) of the Charter. In addition, a
coalition of intervenors argued that the requirement to include child
support payments in her income was also discriminatory on the basis of sex
as it had an adverse impact on women compared to men. The
inclusion/deduction system, as it was called, not only required recipients of
child support (generally women) to include the amount in income, but it
also gave a tax deduction to payors of support (generally men). The
rationale was that giving men a tax deduction for child support payments
while requiring women to include the amount in their income actually
resulted in a tax subsidy that would help defray the extra expense of raising
children when parents had divorced or separated. The subsidy arose
because women tend to earn less than men and thus pay tax at a lower rate.
So, for example, if the amount of child support is 10 thousand dollars a
year and the father earns a high income and pays tax at an average rate of
45 per cent but the mother has a lower income and pays tax at an average
rate of 20 per cent, she pays 2 thousand dollars in taxes but he saves 4
thousand dollars in taxes owing. The difference, 2,500 dollars, is the tax
subsidy. The problem, of course, is who actually gets that subsidy: generally,
it is not shared between them because it is reflected in the payor's saved
taxes and not the amount of the award received by the mother (even if
grossed up).
In Thibaudeau, the Supreme Court split on gender lines, as it had
done in Symes, with the men on the Court finding that the requirement to
include child support payments in income did not discriminate against
Suzanne Thibaudeau, and the two women on the Court dissenting. Once
again, the majority was totally resistant to any notion of the gendered
impact of these tax rules.12 8 The way the Court was able to reach that
conclusion was by refusing to view a woman who is separated from her
husband as someone who was no longer attached to her previous partner.
The majority found that the "post-divorce family unit" was better off with
the inclusion/deduction system because it usually generated a tax subsidy
for the couple and thus there was no discrimination against Suzanne
127 Thibaudeau, supra note 36 at 687, 702.
128 This raises the question of what impact class played in this decision. As with Beth Symes, the
Court had before them an articulate, educated, middle-class woman in Suzanne Thibaudeau.
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Thibaudeau.129 This logic provided an elegantly devious way to erase
women from the picture of how the inclusion/deduction system worked.
Even though a woman separates from her male partner and has custodial
responsibility for children, which is a highly gendered experience, she
suddenly becomes part of this ungendered "post-divorce family unit." This
is also a novel twist given the use of this same phrase in the United States
to refer to the custodial parent and child 130 and given that the unit of
taxation in Canada is the individual. Suzanne Thibaudeau should have been
treated as such.
Thinking back to the discussion of child custody law, it appears that
once a couple has a child, it remains a family forever. Neither separation,
nor divorce, nor even remarriage by one or both of the parties dissolves the
family, at least insofar as the inclusion/deduction rules apply to it.
Moreoever, viewing divorced or separated individuals as part of a couple
for tax purposes reinforces the role of the privatized family as exclusively
responsible for the support of children, even when the family, as such, no
longer exists.' 3 '
Interestingly, the problematic Supreme Court decision in
Thibaudeau produced a political victory of sorts. The combination of an
outcry in the press and outstanding lobbying by women's groups led to
legislative change. 132 The federal government repealed the
inclusion/deduction rules as they applied to child support orders made or
varied after April 30, 1997. In conjunction with the provinces, it also
strengthened enforcement measures for child support and introduced the
child support guidelines. At the same time, it took the surplus tax dollars
that arose with the repeal of the rules and used some of them to enhance
the Working Income Supplement of the Child Tax Credit. Some progress
thus emerged from the Thibaudeau struggle, albeit progress that accords
with the privatization of economic responsibilities for children and that
plays into reinforcement of the ongoing economic ties between parents who
no longer live together.

129 Thibaudeau, supra note 36 at 675-76.
130 Tropea v. Tropea, 87 N.Y.2d 727 (N.Y. C.A. 1996).
131 Claire F.L. Young, "It's All in the Family: Child Support, Tax and Thibaudeau" (1995)
6Const.
Forum Const. 107.
132 Jennifer Quaile, "'At the Mercy' of Patriarchy: Women and the Struggle over Child Support"
in T. Brettel Dawson, ed., Women, Law and Social Change, 3d ed. (Toronto: Captus Press, 1998) 531.
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Summary of Impact of Feminist Challenges

The feminist-inspired challenge to the unencumbered individual of
liberalism in the 1992 Supreme Court decision inMoge was thus limited and
did not extend to tax law. As well, Moge can be read as part of a larger trend
towards privatizing the economic insecurity of women and children.
Moreover, we have witnessed the rise, again, of formal equality and gender
neutrality, along with a new spin on familial ideology: the post-divorce
family unit.
Putting these trends together, women can be said to be at risk in the
family law context. Under child custody law, they will be held responsible
not only for primary care for children but also for ensuring that fathers have
a relationship with their children. This responsibility may include fathers
who have a biological tie with the children but not necessarily a socialparenting relationship. Overall, trends in parenting law indicate that
mothers will increasingly confront resistance if they attempt to raise their
children autonomous from identifiable fathers. 13 3 Moreover, mothers are
increasingly reliant on men to obtain the financial means to support their
children. If the fathers of their children are willing and able to pay under
the child support guidelines, this privatized remedy may not cause hardship.
However, enforcement remains a problem. In addition, the child support
system now binds mothers to the other parent of their children well into the
future and prevents women from being autonomous from their ex-partners
when they need to be. Furthermore, child support takes priority over
spousal support under the new guideline approach, and we have seen that
if women sign away their financial remedies, they will not be treated
sympathetically by the courts.
The challenges in the tax law context resonate with those in family
law. The biggest challenge is that as long as the tax system is used to deliver
sophisticated social programs, in whole or in part, tax law and policy must
take into account hitherto ignored realities such as the gendered nature of
child care, the adverse impact on women of privatization of responsibility
for economic security, women's unequal access to well-paying jobs, and the
undervaluation of women's labour in the home. Only then can we really
understand the impact of these tax policies on women and decide whether
the tax system can, in fact, ever be an effective tool by which to implement
complex social and economic policy.

13 3

Johnston-Steeves v. Lee (1997), 209 A.R. 292 (C.A.); Trociuk, supra note
95.
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CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE

By the turn of the twenty-first century, it was increasingly unpopular
to talk about gender-specific patterns in the family and in society. There
was more talk of post-feminism and the need to offer women choice in the
form of their relationships. Feminists who focused on women's material
inequality were often cast as old-fashioned thinkers who had not moved
with the times, who constructed women as victims, and who invoked
antiquated notions about the role of the state in supporting economic wellbeing. Feminists who focused on child custody law were charged with failing
to acknowledge men's potential and the extent to which fathers were now
parenting equally. It was also suggested that adults who "choose" to have
children must realize that they will have to compromise their own interests
for the sake of those children. It was apparently unseemly to talk about
women's (in)equality when children were at issue.
Women in the early twenty-first century certainly have a greater
array of lifestyles from which to choose than was true even two decades ago.
However, the terrain on which these choices are made remains starkly
uneven. In an era of increased individual responsibility for one's socioeconomic well-being and for one's personal choices, which corresponds with
the diminishing role of the social welfare state, women who choose badly
13 4
are left with the consequences for which they themselves are blamed.
Women who live in poverty are too often blamed for their social condition,
and they are also encouraged to rely on family-which sometimes means
returning to abusive partners-in order to find financial support for
themselves and for their children. Women with young children are
encouraged to retool for the workplace, often without daycare support or
adequate jobs available to them. Women constitute two-thirds of the
population working in minimum wage jobs,'3 5 earning salaries that make it
virtually impossible to support themselves, let alone their children (twenty
seven thousand single parents in Canada are earning minimum wage).136
This over-representation of women spans all age groups, with rates for
women nearly doubling those for men. This problem is not, then,
diminishing for the younger generation of women. Many of these jobs that
134 In the context of poor women and bad choices, see Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General),
[2002] 4 S.C.R. 429; Gwen Brodsky, "Gosselin v. Quebec (A.G.): Autonomy with a Vengeance" (2003)
15 C.J.W.L. 194 at 205-07.
135 Deborah Sussman & Martin Tabi, Minimum Wage Workers (Ottawa: Statistics Canada,
2004);
Mark Hume, "Number of minimum-wage earners falling, Statscan finds" Globe and Mail (27 March
2004) A13.
13 6
Hume, ibid.
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women "choose" fall within the "precarious work" category: minimum wage
jobs with few hours and without health, dental, or pension benefits. 3 7
The image of the successful career woman who juggles a well-paying
job with a family may dominate the media, but in reality it represents a
minority of women. More commonly, Canadian women struggle to provide
for their families, and the faces of the women who are struggling are
disproportionately those of women with disabilities, First Nations women,
and women of colour. In contrast, the faces of women appearing in highprofile family law and tax law cases are disproportionately those of white
women with higher education and skills. Moge was the exception. For
obvious reasons, these women more often obtain legal representation in a
time of severely decreased legal aid. Our legal precedents are therefore
based on women with some degree of privilege, Hartshorne providing a
recent example. This is not to say that these women had no legitimate legal
complaint. But it is a problem if they are taken as emblematic of the
modern woman, that is, divorced but with professional skills that she can
polish for quick re-entry to the labour force.
A key objective for feminists must then be to find remedies that
address the needs of the most disadvantaged women, who have not been
represented often in litigation. Strategies might include the following
tactics:
" Ensuring that women have financial security for themselves and
those they care for, and have their unpaid work recognized, but
not requiring them to be tied legally or psychologically to former
spouses in order to be financially secure;
* Recognizing that the tax system may not be the way to deliver the
social programs that are so important to women's economic wellbeing, such as childcare and retirement saving; and
* Moving away from the privatizing trends that have particularly
adverse impacts on women.
Yet, we identify at least three impediments to these feminist legal
struggles. First is the limited value of the Charter as a tool for change in
family law and tax law. Second is the lack of access to justice in this era of
cuts to legal aid and women's centres, which in turn diminishes the extent
to which women who are racialized, poor, disabled, or immigrant will
See Leah F. Vosko, Temporary Work The Gendered Rise of a Precarious Employment
Relationship(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).
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appear in the legal system. Third, the trend of renewed liberal
individualism, with its rhetoric of autonomy and choice, poses great
difficulty for feminists when it comes to influencing public policy, especially
with respect to the intersection of race, class, sexuality, and disability with
gender. Each impediment will be discussed in turn.
In the mid-1980s, it was easier to be relatively optimistic about the
potential of the Charteras a tool through which to challenge discriminatory
provisions. Numerous examples of sex discrimination in the ITA appeared
to fit within section 15(1), although there was concern about how section
1 might play out. Since that time, and with the defeats in Symes and
Thibaudeau, along with the continued imperviousness of the tax system to
the feminist critique, we have become more pessimistic. Our pessimism
relates to two particular themes. First, even though the courts have said
that the ITA is subject to Charterscrutiny, they continue to view it as a highly
complex technical instrument, the fundamental purpose of which is to raise
taxes. As Kathleen Lahey has said, "although the courts have insisted that
fiscal legislation should be subjected to the same level of scrutiny as other
types of legislation, they have actually paid Parliament greater deference
on income tax policy than on other matters.' ' 138 In Thibaudeau, Justice
Gonthier, speaking for the majority, referred to the "special nature" of the
ITA and alluded to the revenue-raising function of the tax system when he
said that it is the "essence of the ITA to make distinctions, so as to generate
revenue for the government while equitably reconciling a range of
divergent interests.' ' 139 Unless the courts are willing to grapple with the tax
expenditure side of the tax system, it is all too easy to ignore its
discriminatory impact. In family law too, the Charterhas had a relatively
limited role, particularly now that the more blatant discrimination on the
face of statutes has been removed, notably in relation to same-sex
relationship recognition."' Although Chartervalueshave had some indirect
impact on cases such as Moge, substantive equality analysis has played a
less-clear role since that time.
The second problem in relation to the Charter, one that lurks
beneath the surface, relates to the cost of remedying the discrimination.
Assuming that one can argue that the impact of the current tax rules
138 Kathleen Lahey, "The Impact of the CanadianCharterofRights and Freedomson Income Tax
Law and Policy" in David Schneiderman & Kate Sutherland, eds., Charting the Consequences: The
Impact of CharterRights on Canadian Law and Politics (Toronto: Published in Association with the
Centre for Constitutional Studies, University of Alberta, University of Toronto Press, 1997) 109 at 110.
See also Philipps, "Discursive Deficits," supra note 44.
139 Thibaudeau, supra note 36 at 675-76.
140 Boyd, "The Impact of the Charter,"supra note 40.
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respecting retirement savings does discriminate against women in
contravention of section 15, then the question becomes whether that
discrimination can be saved under section 1. At this stage of the analysis,
the significant cost that would arise from the measures required to end the
discrimination can become an impediment. In Egan v. Nesbit,141 a case in
which a gay man challenged the heterosexual definition of spouse in the
Old Age SecurityAct, 142 Justice Sopinka talked about balancing competing
interests. The basis for his section 1 analysis was that Egan was about socioeconomic policy, as is the ITA. The costs of extending benefits and the
government's limited resources were central to his reasoning. As he said "it
is not realistic for the Court to assume that there are unlimited funds to
'
address the needs of all."143
The relevance of cost in determining whether
discrimination may be justified is not resolved. As Margot Young has
observed, "[R]ecent human rights jurisprudence and legislation warn
against assuming that cost, from the perspective of denial of equality rights,
will safely continue to be largely irrelevant."' 44
The second impediment relates to access to justice. We have
discussed key cases in our respective areas and made the point that the
litigants in those cases tended to be middle-class, professional women.
Where is the voice of other, less-advantaged women? Certainly,
organizations such as LEAF do intervene in many of these cases in order to
expand the discourse and the range of voices heard. But at the individual
level, women are facing a crisis in terms of their access to legal advice and
justice. Legal aid in Canada has been decimated, especially in relation to
family law. In British Columbia, women's centres have lost their funding
and cannot offer the informal legal support that has been so important to
women over the years. It is of little use to have improvements to legislation
and positive judicial precedents if women cannot get access to the legal
remedies offered by legislation and cases. Improved legal aid is crucial,
preferably in the form of legal aid clinics, although even then, women in
rural areas will face challenges in gaining access to legal advice.
The third impediment is that feminists have experienced difficulties
in being heard in public policy debates over recent years. The Department
of Justice consultations with women's groups no longer occur. A notable
lack of gender-specific analysis of spousal abuse and caregiving can be
141 Egan v. Nesbit, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 [Egan].
142 R.S.C. 1985 c. 0-9.
143 Supra note 141 at 572.
144Margot Young, "Change at the Margins: Eldridge v. British Columbia
(AG) and Friend v.

Alberta" (1998) 10 C.J.W.L. 259.
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detected in the government documents in the custody and access law
reform process in recent years that prompted some women's groups,
including NAWL, to boycott a public consultation in 2001 and instead to
frame their response to the consultation document in the form of a brief.145
The now-shelved Bill C-22 (AnAct toAmend the [child custody parts of the]
Divorce Act) was arguably influenced somewhat by the many wellresearched submissions by women's groups during the law reform process,
and the "one size does not fit all" philosophy underlying Bill C-22 reflected
an effort to avoid the pro-contact ethos of the Australian and English
legislation, which has generated great problems for women and children,
especially in situations of abuse.1 46 However, Bill C-22 carefully avoided any
references to gendered patterns within families: mothers and fathers were
leveled in public discourse.
When it comes to tax policy decisions, feminists still have little
influence. Certainly, NAWL does stalwart work with its annual budget
submissions, well thought out and beautifully crafted proposals that would,
if implemented, make a big difference to ensuring that our tax system is
more reflective of the needs of women. To date, NAWL has tackled
numerous important issues such as the caregiver credit, personal income
tax cuts, the childcare expense deduction, the inclusion/deduction rules
respecting spousal support payment, and myriad important issues for
women. NAWL'S central message has been "good fiscal policy making must
take gender into account.""' Unfortunately, a meaningful incorporation of
these ideas into the budget measures has not yet occurred. At a broader
level, the Joint Commonwealth Secretariat and the International
Development Research Centre research team has been working on The
Gender Responsive Budget Project, but again, some wonderful ideas and
measures have yet to make their way into the legislation.
Finally, there is the ongoing problem of women being viewed as a
homogenous group. We are mindful of lessons about intersectionality
learned from our former colleague Marlee Kline, who challenged feminists
to be attentive to how law affected women whose race, class, gender, and
sexuality intersected in complex ways. 48 Ten years ago, it was observed that
judges had an easier time comparing the status of a white woman to that of
145 Ontario Women's Network on Custody and Access, Brief to the Federal, Provincial,Territorial
Family Law Committee on Custody, Access and Child Support (Ottawa: NAWL, June 2001) at 6.
146 Rhoades & Boyd, "Reforming Custody Laws," supra note 94.
147 The National Association of Women and the Law, Pre-Budget Submission
to the Standing
Committee on Finance, House of Commons, October 2001.
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a white man. 149 It was harder to introduce the impact of race, for instance,
into this comparison. Now, however, even differences between white
women and white men are being obviated in law and public policy, or at
least, no one wants anymore to explicitly identify such differences in public
documents. Thus, it may be even more difficult to ensure that the voices of
women whose experiences differ because of their race or class are heard
and that law and public policy appropriately address the impact of class,
race, sexuality, and disability. It may be that feminists have not pushed far
enough their analysis of precisely how factors such as race and gender
intersect: our impression is that the literature is far richer than either law
or public policy on this point.
Feminists have had to work hard to deal with these intersections in
our work, not always with success. In family law reform, for instance, briefs
often mention diversity of women, but solutions still seem geared towards
straight, white women. In relation to the high profile Van de Perre v.
Edwards' case involving custody of a mixed-race child, it seemed difficult
to prompt a meaningful feminist discussion of how complicated the
intersections were between gender, race, and class. Interestingly, while
avoiding a broad analysis that might have acknowledged the impact of
systemic, institutionalized racial oppression on racialized children, the
Court briefly addressed issues that have in the past been raised by
feminists: the significance of the history of care of a child and the
questionable significance of a father offering a "substitute" mother in the
form of a wife/step-mother as opposed to being judged on his own merits.
However, it did so in a way that could be read as diminishing the
importance of race and racism. Justice Bastarache, for the Court, indicated
that "racial identity is but one factor that may be considered in determining
personal identity; the relevancy of this factor depends on the context. Other
factors are more directly related to primary needs and must be considered
in priority.""'15 The Court emphasized that actual parenting should be taken
into account rather than lifestyle or family form, again a point that
feminists have made in the past. As a result, the case of the low-income
Caucasian single mother who had cared for the child since birth was
strengthened in relation to the wealthy African-American married father
with a stay-at-home wife. How we can analyze this case without prioritizing
either race or gender remains a challenge.
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Meanwhile, on the culture front, we have seen the push for separate
dispute resolution mechanisms for those who wish to be governed by
Islamic family law, and apparently, some positive reception of this proposal
despite the resistance of the Canadian Council of Muslim Women. 152 This
initiative may or may not be the kind of answer that Marlee Kline would
have suggested when she called for greater attention to race and culture.
We have yet to have some of those difficult conversations about when, and
precisely how, race and culture should be 1taken
into account in law reform
53
without diminishing women's autonomy.
On a more positive note, feminists continue to take significant
initiatives on these and other issues. Feminists in Vancouver have initiated
an important ongoing project on poverty and human rights that focuses on
social and economic rights and considers, among other things, the
intersections of gender, poverty, and race.'54 At a recent feminist meeting
on family law reform organized by NAWL, these questions were also central.
The group discussed the dangers of simply putting wording on race and
culture into child custody statutes, without providing context for how
racism operates. Also identified were the particular difficulties confronting
Aboriginal women in remote communities, and the extreme lack of access
to justice that they face. The discussion was sobering, in that it pointed to
the rather limited success that feminist engagement with family law reform
has had to date, and how superficial is a review of case law and legislative
change, such as we have offered in this lecture. The women at that meeting
concluded that enormous work still needed to be done with feminist input
at all levels, and committed themselves to undertaking that work. For those
who might suggest that feminism is dead, or has become a caricature of
itself, we disagree at the most profound level.

152 See Alia Hogben, "Sharia as Family Law in Canada?" (2004) 23 Jurisfemme
3, 11.
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